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In the Supretne Court of the 
State of Utah 
LEGAL SUCCESSOIRS IN INTEREST TO 
ESTATES OF THOMAS CLOTWORTHY, 
and SA!RAH M. CLOTWORTHY, both de-
ceased: 
SARAH J. WITT; 
JANET HATCH; _ 





JOHN MARVIS CLOTWORTHY; 
ALPHONZO B. MURJDOCK, Jr; 
WILLIAM COLE; 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
DON CLYDE and KATHRYN CLYDE, his 
wife; VIRGIL P. JACOBSON and EVA 
JACOBSON, his wife; 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS• BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 7962 
In 1900, Alphonzo B. Murdock, also known as A. B. 
Murdock, entered into a purchase contract with the State 
of Utah, identified as Certificate of Sale No. 3020, under 
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the terms of whi-ch he was to acquire from the State Sec-
tions 14, 15, 22, and 23 in Township 4 South, Range 2 East. 
Under the contract a specified sum was paid in cash, and 
the balance, together with interest, was to be paid in ten 
equal annual installments (Defendants' Exhibit A). In 
1901, the said A. B. Murdock, by an agreement in writing 
and duly acknowledged, sold Section 14 to one Thomas Clot-
worthy and agreed to convey the same when patent was 
obtained. Good and adequate consideration in annual pay-
ments was provided for in the written instrument, Which 
was recorded in Wasatch County (Plaintiff's Exhibit A, 
page 5), Thomas Clotworthy went into possession of Sec-
tion 14 and used it as grazing land (Tr. 47). Section 14 
was known as the ''Clotworthy Section", and it was fenced 
(Tr. 48, 52). 
Thomas Clotworthy died intestate in 1905, and in that 
· year probate ot his estate was commenced (Defendants' 
Exhi-bit B). In the inventory filed September 30, 1905, 
and in subsequent documents filed in connection with the 
probate of the estate, the interest of the decedent in the 
property in question was described, substantially, as follows: 
"Eighth piece----consisting of a contract to purchase 
fr.om Alphonzo B. Murdock the following described 
tract of land, to-wit: All of Section 14, Township 4 
South, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Said land having been sold to Alphonzo B. Murdock by 
the State of Utah under and by virtue of Certificate of 
Sale, of State Lands, No. 3020 . . . ." (Def. Ex-
hibit B). 
The estate paid the taxes and the annual payment up 
to and including the year 1907 (Defendants' Exhibit B, 
Final Account of Administrator). 
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In the Decree of Distribution, filed April 4, 1907, the 
contract for the purchase of Section 14 was distributed one-
half to the widow, Sarah M. Clotworthy, and one-twelfth 
to each child (Defendants' Exhibit B). By a Decree of Par-
tition, filed about one month later, on May 6. 1907, Sarah 
M. Clotworthy, widow of the deceased, received as her sole 
and separate property, together with other property, (De-
fendants' Exhibit B) , the following: 
"7-A contract of purchase from Alphonzo B. Murdock 
of all of Section 14, in Township 4 South of Range 6 
East, Salt Lake lVIeridian, containing 640 acres." 
The property was entered upon the Inventory at an ap-
praised figure of $800, and Sarah M. Clotworthy took the 
same, as a part of her share, at a valuation of $3,200 (De-
fendants' Exhibit B). Each minor child was duly repre-
sented by a guardian, and each such child received his or 
her share of the estate in cash (!Defendants' Exhibit B) . 
On or about March 23, 1908, Sarah· M. Clotworthy, by 
an instrument in writing, gave one Chase Hatch a Power 
of Attorney authorizing him to convey real estate owned 
by her .. That Power of Attorney was recorded in Wasatch 
County (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, page 36), but was not filed 
with the State of Utah. The power was never expressly 
revoked, and was in full force and effect in 1908, at the time 
the assignment hereinafter mentioned was made. The offi-
1 
cial records of the Secretary of State of the State of Utah 
(Defendants' Exhibit A) show the following instrument: 
''Assignment 
For and in consideration of Three Thousand Dol-
lars, to me in hand paid by James W. Clyde of Heber 
City, Utah, I hereby sell, assign, and transfer unto the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
said James W. Clyde all of my right, title and interest 
in and to the within certificate of sale and the land 
which it covers; which interest represents one-fourth 
thereof; said one-fourth covering by mutual agreement 
with the holder of the other three-fourths interest 
therein, all of Section 14, Township 4 South of Range 
6 East of Salt Lake Meridian, the holder of said other 
three~fourths taking Sections 15, 22 and 23 in said 
Township and Range. 
SARAH M. CLOTWORTHJY 
By Chas. Hatch 
Attorney in Fact 
Witness 
/s/ J. C. Jensen 
STATE 0 1F UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH }ss. 
On the 21st day of September A. D. 1908, person-
ally appeared before me, Sarah M. Clotworthy, the 
signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowl-
edged to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires 
August 25, 1909" 
/s/ J. C. Jensen 
Notary Public 
James W. Clyde had previously acquired all of the in-
terest of A. B. Murdock in and to Certificate No. 3020 by 
assignment through one A.M. Murdock, bearing date Janu-
ary 25, 1907 (Defendants' Exhibit B). James W. Clyde 
went into possession of Sections 15, 22, and 23 in 1907 and 
took over possession of Section 14 in the year 1908 (Tr. 48, 
55). Never, since the years 1907 and 1908, has anyone 
other than James W. Clyde and his successors in interest 
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5 
had any use or occupation of the premises (Tr. 48). Taxes 
on the property have always been paid by James W. Clyde 
or his successors in interest (Tr. 72.) . All of the property 
in Section 14 lying north and east of Lake Creek has been 
assessed to Defendant Virgil J acobcen and his predecessors 
in interest since 1915. Prior to 1915 all of Section 14 lying 
south and west of Lake Creek was assessed to James 
W. Clyde and his successors in interest. Since 1911 taxes 
on the remaining three sections have been assessed to 
"Thomas Clotworthy Estate" and to either James W. Clyde 
or Don Clyde (Tr 72). James W. Clyde made the annual 
payments to the State of Utah on Certificate of Sale No. 
3020 after he acquired Mrs. Clotworthy's interest. None 
of the plaintiffs, or anyone in their behalf ,ever claimed any 
right or interest in the property at all until about one year 
before this case was tried (Tr. 49, 74). None of the plain-
tiffs have ever been on any of the land in question (Tr. 17, 
49). 
On the 5th day of January, 1911, the State of Utah is-
sued patents as follows: An undivided one-fourth interest 
in Sections 14, 15, 22, and 23 to ''The Legal Successors in 
interest to the Estate of Thomas Clotworthy, deceased", 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, page 12), and an undivided three-
fourths interest in and to the same sections to James W. 
Clyde (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, page 13). Part of Seceion 14 
was conveyed by Warranty Deed from James W. Clyde in 
1915 and after several other conveyan,ces came into the 
hands of defendant Virgil P. Jacobsen in the year 1929 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, pages 14, 16, 24). Part of the prop-
erty has also been mortgaged on several occasions (Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit A, pages 15, 17, 18). Sections 15, 22 and 23 
have also been the subject of several conveyances for valu.; 
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6 
able consideration (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, pages 25 and 30). 
When the patents were issued by the State, the State Rec-
ords did not contain the Power of Attorney from Sarah M. 
Clotworthy to Chase Hatch, nor did they contain the con-
tract of purchase between Thomes Clotworthy and Alphonzo 
B. Murdock. Both of said instruments were on file in Wa-
satch CoWlty. 
On or about the 17th day of May, 1952, certain of the 
plaintiffs, claiming to be "Legal Successors in Interest to 
the Estate of Thomas Clotworthy, deceased", filed a com-
plaint in Wasatch County against these defendants, claim-
ing that they were the owners and tenants in common with 
the defendants and praying that an undivided one-fourth 
part of all four sections be partitioned and set over to them. 
Defendants filed their Answer denying any ownership, 
possesion, tenancy or interest on the part of any of the 
plaintiffs, and claiming complete fee ownership by the de-
fendants. The Answer also set forth, as an alternative de-
fense and affirmative cause of action, facts in support of 
and a prayer for an order quieting title in the defendants. 
The case was tried to the court, sitting without a 
jury, on the 6th and 7th days of November, 1952, and there-
after the court found in favor of the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
That the trial court could properly have found and held, 
under the evidence in this case, that the plaintiffs had no 
legal or equitable interest whatever in the property here 
considered. 
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POINT II 
In the alternative, that if the court did find that the 
plaintiffs were tenants in common witll. the defendants' 
predecessor in interest, then the defendants are entitled to 
a decree quieting the title in them by reason of adverse pos-
session. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I AND IT 
There can be no question but that the court admitted 
the patents in evidence. They are set out in the abstract 
of title which was offered and received, without objeetion, 
as Plaintiffs Exhibit Exhibit A. 
Plaintiffs, without benefit of any authority whatever, 
take the position that ''Legal Successors in Interest to the 
Estate of Thomas Clotworthy, deceased", as used on the 
patent, can only mean "Heirs at Law" and that the patent 
thereby conveyed the interest to the named plaintiffs in 
this case. As a matter of law, there is no basis for any 
such position. Under and by virtue of the estate preceed-
ings (Defendants Exhibit B) the decedent's interest was 
partitioned to his widow, Sarah M. Clotworthy, as part of 
her share of the estate. Prior to the issuance of the· patent, 
she assigned that interest to James W. Clyde. At the time 
of the issuance of the patent James W. Clyde was the "Le-
gal Successor in Interest" to the, said estate. The word 
''legal" means that which is according to law. Words and 
Phrases, Vol. 24, pages 524-525. "Successor in interest" in-
cludes administrator. Moss v. Ramsey (Old.) 153 Pac. 843 
and the term "successor in interest" includes assignees. 
Barr v. Roderick (Cal.) 11 Fed. (2) 984; McNulta v. Hunt-
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8 
ington, 70 NYS 897. The fact that the patent was not is-
sued ~:til after the decree of partition makes no difference. 
102-~0-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
Plaintiff, also without citation of authority, urges the 
Court to adopt the position that the trial court could not, 
as a matter of law, look beyond the patent. This Court long 
ago held that it could be shown that a patent was improvi-
dently issued or fraudulently obtained and therefore void. 
Glassman v. O'Donnell, 6 Utah 446, 24 P. 587. 
Defendants' Exhibit A was a transcript of the records 
of the Secretary of State kept by that office in connection 
with the sale by the State and the patent of the lands in 
question. The transcript was duly certified by the Secre-
tary of State. A public record of private writing may be 
proved by the original record or by a copy thereof certified 
by the legal keeper of the record. 104-47-14, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1948. 
Defendants' Exhibit B was the complete record of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in Probate No 107 in Wa-
satch County, entitled "Thomas Clotworthy Estate." It 
_was a judicial record of the trial court and a public writing. 
104-47-4, Utah CO<\e Annotated, 1948. It could be proved 
by the producti.on of the original or by a copy thereof cer-
~fied by the clerk having the legal custody thereof. 104--
47-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1948. 
Defendants' Exhibit A shows the assignment from 
Sarah M. Clotworthy to James W. Clyde and Defendants' 
Exhibit B shows the partition of Thomas Clotworthy's in-
terest in the property to his widow, Sarah M. Clotworthy. 
Obviously, both exhiibits were material and admissable. 
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POINTS III, IV AND V 
The plaintiffs' argument on this point is confusing. It 
is argued that the defendants' predecessor in interest knew 
of the so called "mistake", but that the present defendants 
cannot assert any claim for relief because they were not 
parties to the mistake. The evidence is uncontradicted that 
defendant Don Clyde knew nothing whatever of any ad-
verse claim on the part of any of these plaintiffs until Mr. 
Witt mentioned it about one year prior to the trial hereof 
(Tr. 15, 49) and defendant Virgil Jacobsen didn't know 
anything about this claim until he was served with Sum-
mons in this action (Tr. 39, 40). These defendants believed 
that James W. Clyde's title was derived through the legal 
successor in interest to the estate of Thomas Clotworthy, 
deceased. If Sarah M. Clotworthy was not the legal succes-
sor in interest of the estate, so far as the property here con-
sidered is concerned, these defendants were never so ~p­
prised until the plaintiffs communicated their claim to them. 
Accordingly, on any theory, under the statute cited by 
plaintiffs, they had three years after notice of plaintiffs' 
claim. 
In his argument counsel for plaintiff argues that the 
assignment from Sarah M. Clotworthy to James W .Clyde 
was not executed because the signature was in "light pen-
cil"; that the acknowledgment was for Sarah M. Clotworthy, 
and that the notary failed to place his seal thereon. 
We are unable to find any statutory provision or case 
law which requires that a conveyance be signed by any par-
ticular medium. Certainly the plaintiff has not cited any 
authority whatever to the effect that a pencil signature is 
not legally adequate At the time this acknowledgment was 
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10 
made the State of Utah had no statutory form for an at-
torney in fact for a conveyance. The statutory form for an 
attorney in fact came in the Code Report and Revised Stat-
utes of 1933. Where the Statute provides no specific form 
of acknowledgment, the form prescribed for ordinary con-
veyances may be used. Annotation: 108 Am. St. Repori8 
532. In those earlier days there was considerable authority 
. ' 
to the effect that an attorney in fact must acknowledge the 
.instrument in the name of his principal, and not in his own 
·name. 1 Am. Jur. 331, 332. In any event, an acknowledg-
ment is the act of the principal wherever it can be discov-
ered that the intention of the party was to act in a repre-
·sentative capacity, and not for himself. Substantial com-
pliance with the form of requirements of Statute is all that 
is required, and it is the settled policy of the courts to sus-
tain Certificatee of Acknowledgment whenever it is possible 
to do so. 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments, Sec. 74, page 344; 
Annotations 29 ALR 926; 72 ALR 1293. Close examina-
tion of the assignment in question (Defendants' Exhibit A) 
will reveal that the paper upon which the assignment was 
made contains an extra notarial seal. The attorney for the 
defendants ·could not tell whether the imprint was of the 
seal of J. C. Jensen or not. Moreover, the presumption, in 
the absence of facts or circumstances to the contrary, is 
that the seal was affixed in due form. Also, in 1943 the 
legislature of the State of Utah validated, among others, all 
instruments of writing copied into the records of the vari-
. ous county recorders previous to January 1, 1943, nothwith-
standing any defect in the acknowledgment. (57-3-9, UCA, 
1953). Prior to that time all such instruments recorded 
prior to January 1, 1921, had been validated by the legis-
lature. 
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The objection of the plaintiff that the assignment was 
improperly received because of a defective acknowledgment 
is not well taken on this appeal, for the reason that plain-
tiff did not raise that objection when the exhibit was of-
fered. The objection stated by counsel for plaintiff at the 
trial was only as to relevancy and materiality. The objec-
tion shown on page 60 of the transcript was as follows: 
"THE COURT: How is that marked, Exhibit 1, 
Defendants' Exhibit 1? 
MR. STANLEY: Defendants' Exhibit 1. 
THE COURT: Any objection: 
MR. STA~Y: Yes, there is an objection, Your 
Honor. It isn't on the ground as to the admissibility, 
as for as the certificate and the admissability in that re-
spect, but we say that is is irrelevant and immaterial, 
not within the issues of this case, the matter therein 
set forth, that now is before the Court. All of the pro-
ceedings therein are proceedings that were had before 
patent, and the patent is conclusive, as to the -convey-
ance of title from the State of Utah to the parties des-
ignated thereon." 
Since the plaintiff did not object to its admissibility be-
cause of ·claimed defective acknowledgment, but only as to 
its relevancy or materiality, he should not now be permitted 
to claim error in the court's receiving it. I Am. Jur., Ack-
nowledgments, Sec. 42, page 330. 
Of course, whether the instrument of assignment in 
the instant case was properly acknowledged so as to entitle-
it to recordation is not a problem here. The plaintiffs in 
this case are not, and do not claim to be, subsequent pur-
chasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration. Un-
der the Laws of the State of Utah, parties to an unacknowl-
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edged or defectively acknowledged instrument, and those in 
privity with such parties, are bound by the instrument 
(57-1-6, U.C.A., 1953); I Am. Jurisprudence, Acknowledg-
ments, Sec. 12, page 321. The heirs and representatives 
of parties to an unacknowledged instrument are bound in 
the same manner as were the persons under whom they 
claim. I Am. Jur., AcknQwledgments, Sec. 12, page 322. 
By the decree of partition in 1907, all of the interest of 
Thomas Clotworthy, deceased, in and to the lands being 
acquired by Alphonzo B. Murdock from the State of Utah, 
was distributed and set over to Sarah M. Clotworthy, widow 
of the deceased, as her sole and separate property {Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit A, pages 7 to 10). Her assignment was made 
in the year 1908. Plaintiffs did not contend at the trial, 
nor do they now directly ·contend, that the contract of pur-
chase distributed to Sarah M. Clotworthy covered other or 
different property from that under consideration in this 
case. The case, Dunn v. Wallingford, 47 Utah 491, 155 P. 
344 7, is not in point. 
For some reason beyond the comprehension of these 
defendants, the plaintiffs refuse to recognize the decree of 
partition, an integral and component part of the estate pro-
ceeding. That decree of partition gave the interest of the 
estate and the interest of any other heirs, to the lands in 
question, to Sarah M. Clotworthy, widow of the deceased 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, pages 7 to 10). There is no ques-
tion but that such a contract interest could be distributed 
or partitioned in the estate proceedings. Plaintiff doesn't 
expressly contend otherwise. 
As previously pointed out in this brief, the term "legal 
successors in interest" doesn't necessarly mean "heirs." 
lVlrs. Clotworthy was the "legal successor in interest of the 
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13 
estate." Had Mr. Clotworthy assigned the contract in his 
lifetime, his assignee would have been the ''legal successor." 
POINTS VI, VII, Vlli, AND IX 
There is a new contention by the plaintiffs raised for 
the first time before the Supreme Court. Plaintiff raised 
no question by either his replies or by motion as to whether 
the cross-claim or counterclaim stated a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. It is required by Rule 12(b), Rules 
of Civil Procedure, that such objection be raised by answer 
or by m,otion. An examination of the case cited by plain-
tiffs, Worley v. Peterson, 80 Utah 27, 12 P(2) 579, shows 
that the contention there considered was properly raised in 
the trial court. That case also holds that the allegations by 
answer and counter-,claim of the defendants aided the com-
plaint and cured the defect of the complaint in such respect. 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that 
"The plaintiffs and defendants are the owners and tenants 
in common" of the land in question, and "they are now- in 
possesion thereof." The complaint prayed for a partition 
of one-fourth of the property to them. Defendants denied 
any ownership or tenancy or possession on the part of the 
plaintiffs; denied that the plaintiffs had any estate of in-
heritance in the property, or had any interest at all. The 
answer sets up the facts and makes claim of sole ownership 
on the part of the defendants, and prays that the Court 
quiet title in the defendants. The answer also sets up an 
alternative defense and affirmative cause of action show-
ing adverse possession by the defendants and a prayer for 
an order quieting this title on that ground. Certainly the 
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pleadings in this case, taken together, show that the plain-
tiffs did assert a claim adverse and hostile to the plaintiffs. 
Worley v. Peterson, supra. 
Plaintiffs persist in taking the position that they are 
owners of an undivided one-fourth interest in the land in 
question because they were "heirs" of Thomas Clotworthy. 
If they claim at all, they must claim under Sarah M. 
Clotworthy. As heirs of Sarah Clotworthy, they stand in 
privity with her, and it matters not that the assignment 
was or was not acknowledged. Plaintiffs did not claim at 
the trial, nor have they claimed in their brief, that Chase 
Hatch, as attorney in fact, did not sign for and in behalf of 
his principal, nor do they claim or assert that he was not 
empowered to do so. 
In their brief plaintiffs. contend that the probate pro-
ceedings did not claim an interest in Certificate of Sale No. 
3020. The Inventory (Defendants' Exhibit B) described 
·the property as Section 14, and further states: 
''Said land having been sold to Alphonzo B. Murdock 
by the State of Utah under and by virtue of Certificate 
of Sale, No. 3020 . . . ." 
On brief, and again without citation of authority, plain-
tiffs state: "The assignment does not have the effect of a 
warranty deed or any other deed which might convey after 
acquired property." In the first place, this was not "after 
acquired property.'' Secondly, when public land has been 
sold by the State, the purchaser's assignee in good faith is 
entitled to a patent therefor, lawfully issued whenever he 
has fully complied with all of the conditions of the purchase, 
and it is held that upon issuance of a patent, even though 
erroneously, to the heirs of the transferrer, the whole title, 
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both legal and equitable, inures to the transferee or his 
heirs. In such case, the issuance of the patent to the trans-
ferrer's heirs could not even vest them with color of title 
to support title by limitation as against the transferree's 
heirs. 42 Am. Jur., Public Lands, Sec. 80, page 858. In the 
instant case the State of Utah, at the time the patents were 
issued, had before it Mrs. Clotworthy's assignment to James 
W Clyde, also a statement to the effect that the Clotworthy 
interest had been distributed and partitioned to Mrs. Clot-
worthy (Defendants' Exhibit A). However, the State did 
not have in its files the Power of Attorney from Mrs. Clot-
worthy to Chase Hatch, who had executed the assignment 
as her attorney in fact. For that reason alone the State is-
sued the patent to the legal successors in interest, so that 
the property would go to whoever was entitled to receive 
it under the law. 
POINT X 
By argument on this point, and mainly by citation of 
statutes, the plaintiffs contend that defendants have failed 
to establish adverse possession. 
Without for one moment conceding that there is any 
merit whatever to plaintiffs' contention that they were or-
iginally co-tenants of the property with defendants' preqe-
cessor in interest, we will concern ourselves with that theory 
of the case. 
If there was such a co-tenancy, it came into existence 
upon the death of Thomas Clotworthy on August 23, 1905, 
and the other co-tenant at that time was one A. M. Mur-
dock (Defendants' Exhibit A). In 1907, James W. Clyde 
succeeded to all of the interest of A. M. Murdock, and in 
that year went into possession of Sections 15, 22 and 23 (Tr. 
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"46). At that time Section 14 was known as the Clotworthy 
Section," and was fenced away from the rest of the ground 
(Tr. 48, 52). In 1908, James W. Clyde went into possession 
of Section 14 (Tr. 57) and from 1908 to the date of the trial 
of this case no one other than James W. Clyde, or his suc-
cessors in interest, had used any part of Sections 14, 15, 22, 
or 23 (Tr. 48). For as far back as 40 or 45 years, the prop-
erty had been used as grazing land (Tr. 47, 57). None of 
the Clotworthy heirs had ever been on the land (Tr. 17, 49). 
None of the Clotworthy heirs had ever indicated that they 
owned or claimed a portion of these sections until about 
one year before the trial (Tr. 49). Defendant Virgil Jacob-
sen had no indication of any claim by any of the Clotwor-
thy heirs until the Summons was served upon him (Tr. 40). 
Never during the time since James W. Clyde acquired the 
property had he or any of his successors in interest paid 
anything to the Clotworthy heirs for the use of the prop-
erty {Tr. 50). Defendant Don Clyde had been in the 
sheep business with his father since he was "big enough to 
be of any use" {Tr. 53) and took over the active manage-
ment of the sheep end of the business 35 years ago. {Tr. 
53) . While part of the property was assessed in the name 
of either James W. Clyde or Don Clyde and to Thomas Clot-
worthy estate, the taxes were paid by Clyde or his suc-
cessors in interest (Stipulation Tr. 72). That part of Sec-
tion 14 lying south and west of Lake Creek had been as-
sessed to the Clydes alone since 1915 Also since 1915 taxes 
on the other portion of Section 14 had been assessed to de-
fendant Virgil Jacobsen or his predecessors in interest 
(Stipulation Tr. 72) 
Part of the property was sold by James W. Clyde in 
the year 1915 to one Heber G. Crook and J. W. Giles Plain-
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tiffs Exhibit A, page 14). Between 1915 and 1925, it was 
mortgaged twice (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, pages 15, 17). 
The property was conveyed again in 1925 and was mort-
gaged the third time (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, pages 16 and 
17). Defendant Virgil Jacobsen bought his land in 1929, 
by Warranty Deed (Tr. 43) and ever since that time he 
has had the sole use and possession of it rrr. 38, 39). De-
fendant Don Clyde purchased Sections 22 and 23 in the year 
1935 and paid valuable consideration for it (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit A, page 25, and Tr. 46, 45). He purchased the bal-
ance of the property from the heirs of James W. Clyde, de-
ceased in the year 1941 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, page 30) , 
for valuable consideration (Tr. 46) . For 40 or 45 years i·t 
has been used as grazing growtd (Tr. 47). 
Asswning that the assignment from Sarah M. Clot-
worthy was invalid, still it serves as "color" of title for de-
fendants to rely upon. Neither of these defendants en-
tered into possession avowedly as tenants in common with 
others. They and their predecessors in interest treated and 
utilized the property as theirs alone. James W. Clyde con-
veyed one-half of Section 14 in 1915, and he conveyed Sec-
tions 22 and 23 in 1935. One-half of Section 14 and Section 
15 passed through his estate. We submit that every un-
equivocal act of complete ownership has been exercised by 
the defendants and their predecessors in interest, and th~t 
the facts and circumstances bring this case clearly within 
the ambit of the rule stated in McCreody v. Frederickson, 
41 Utah 388, 126 Pac. 316. 
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CONCLUSION 
:Defendants submit that the plaintiffs have failed to 
show any error whatever on the part of the trial court, and 
that the appeal should be dismissed and that the respond-
ents should have judgment against the appellants for their 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH & BULLOCK, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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